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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION POLICY ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL SECTORS IN ETHIOPIA- AN ARDL MODELING 
APPROACHES 
By  
Sime, Workenh Eshatuu  
 
The study analyzes the impact of financial liberalization policy on the development of the 
financial sector in Ethiopia during the period 1973-2005. Specifically, it investigates whether 
financial liberalization policy exerts a different effect on the financial sectors development in the 
short run and long run, whether; there are differences in various financial reform policies. To that 
end the paper employs persaran’s (2001) bound test to the ARDL model. The sources of the data 
are World Bank, International Monterey Fund, National Bank of Ethiopia and Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development of Ethiopia. The finding of the study shows that in the long 
run financial liberalization policy has positive and statistically significant impact on the 
development of financial sectors. But in the short run it didn’t have any impacts on the 
development of financial sectors. Liberalization in banking supervision is the most effective and 
efficient financial liberalization policy in Ethiopia. The positive impacts of the financial 
liberalization policy show the better implementation status of the Ethiopia governments. The 
policy implication of the study is that the Ethiopia government should have to fasten the full 
liberalization of financial sectors to maximize the benefit for the country.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, the common question for all economists is why country growth at different rates? 
Some researchers try to list out the main reason for differences in economic development such as 
the differences in factor production, institutional development, legal system effectiveness and 
international trade. Still different scholars found out different factors for the world economic 
differences. Recently, the roles of the financial sectors start to receive due attention. The 
financial development and economic growth have direct relationships. This can be proved that in 
more developed country the financial system is much better than the developing country’s 
financial system (Mohsin and Abdelhak 2000). More developed financial system facilitate the 
economic development of those country through (i) providing information before funding (ii) for 
monitoring and evaluation after funding, (iii) easing management of risks, (iv) encouraging 
saving and (v) facilitating trades(Juzhong et al, 2009). Therefore, it would seem that policies to 
develop the financial sector would be expected to raise economic growth. The theoretical basis 
for the relationship between financial liberalization and financial development originates from 
the seminal work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). Both Mckinnon and Shaw argue that 
the financial liberalization promotes financial development. This study, therefore; examined the 
nexus between financial liberalization and financial development in Ethiopia during 1973-2005.   
There are two main objective of this study; first to identify the impact of financial sectors reform 
policy on the development of the financial sectors in Ethiopia both in the short run and the long 
run. It will prove whether financial reform policy causes the development of the financial sectors 
as stated by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw W. (1973). The second is to identify the promising 
Financial Liberalization policy in Ethiopia. 
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The study answered the following questions: What is the short run impact of financial sectors 
liberalization on the development of financial sectors in Ethiopia? What is the long run impact of 
financial sectors liberalization on the development of financial sectors in Ethiopia? Which 
financial liberalization policy is more effective in the country?  
There are two extreme points of views on the impact of the financial reform policy on the 
development of the financial sectors. The first views are those who argue that financial 
liberalization is the effective strategy for booming of financial sectors. It is supported by 
McDonald and Schumacher (2007) and Andersen and trap (2003). Their view is that financial 
liberalization has positive impacts on the development of financial sectors consequently financial 
development accelerates the economic development of that country. The second view is those 
who argue that financial liberalization is the cause for financial crisis and it resulted in the down 
turn of the financial sectors in the country. Supported by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) 
and Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) they argue that financial liberalization induces risk taking 
behavior and may cause banking crisis.  
Having these different arguable issues, the study proved the following hypothesis: First, financial 
liberalization has statistically insignificant impacts on the development of the financial sectors in 
the short run. Second, Financial liberalization policy has positive and statistically significant 
impacts on the development of financial sectors in the long run. Lastly, all indicators of financial 
reform have important impact on the development of the financial sectors in Ethiopia. 
 
This study is different when we compare with other research conducted in this area in Ethiopia. 
First, analyzing the short run and the long run the impact of the financial liberalization policy on 
the development of the financial sectors is the beginning in Ethiopian financial history. Second, 
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this research is unique in its methodology which used the Autoregressive Distributive lag 
(ARDL) approach to co integration for analyzing the data. 
 
This study was useful for Ethiopia governments in alarming the policy designer of the country to 
focus on full liberalization of financial sectors in Ethiopia. In addition to this, one of the specific 
objectives of this study was to find out the promising financial liberalization policy for Ethiopia 
government. This objective helps for Ethiopia policy designers to fully explore this specific 
promising financial liberalization policy at maximum to maximize the benefits for the country. 
Furthermore, the studies contribute for the financial liberalization literature by identifying and 
analyzing the time specific impacts of financial liberalization policy i.e. the short run and the 
long run impacts.   
 
The rest of the paper divided as follows: The second section is the literature reviews; section 
three discussed the Data and Model specification. The empirical result is covered in section four. 
Lastly, the study covers the summary and policy recommendation.    
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Financial Liberalization and Economic Development 
Schumpeter (1912) and more recently McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), are the first scholars 
in analyzing the theoretical relationship between financial development and financial 
liberalization as well as its impacts on the economic development. They recommend that 
government restrictions on the banking system hinder financial development and ultimately 
reduce growth. Similar conclusions are also reached by more recent endogenous growth 
literature, in which services provided by financial intermediaries (such as information collection 
and analysis, risk sharing, liquidity provision etc.) are explicitly modeled. These models suggest 
that financial intermediation has a positive effect on economic growth. 
On their paper of the theoretical basis for the relationship between financial Liberalization and 
Financial Development, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and the endogenous growth 
literature explain how financial development directly related to financial liberalization. In their 
paper they assume that investments can’t take place unless it is preceded by the accumulation of 
financial capital. McKinnon’s model stipulates that the higher real rate of interest, the more 
willing the investor to accumulate the financial capital. Thus, both McKinnon and Shaw 
emphasize the real interest rate as the principal determinant of financial capital in the financial 
system. As such, controls on interest rates keep the real rate of return on deposits artificially low, 
thereby discouraging the accumulation of financial capital and creating a negative impact on 
financial development in the process. 
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2.2. The Evolution of Financial Liberalization 
After Second World War, there are three main economic Development model in the world. From 
1940 to 1960/70 development through industrialization and accumulation of endogenous 
scientific, technology and production capabilities, from 1980 to 1990s Stabilization, 
Liberalization and development through international trade and poverty reduction programmer 
and from 2000 onwards development through virtuous participation in global knowledge 
economy. Depending on these general world economic model, all country design different 
strategies in line with this model. African countries turned to financial liberalization in the 1990s, 
often in the context of stabilization and reform programs supported by World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund. 
Menzie and Hiro (2006) in their studies on “What matters for Financial Development? Capital 
Controls, Institutions and Interactions” using a panel data encompassing 108 countries over the 
period 1980 to 2000. His study shows that financial liberalization has positive effects on the 
financial development when the institutional set up is better in the country. They also found out 
that rather than the finance specific legal institutions, the overall legal set up is the best for 
financial development as well as pre-opening of the goods markets is essential for booming of 
the financial sectors.  
Thierry Tressel and Enrica Detragiachel on their paper “Do Financial Sector Reform Lead to 
Financial Development?” they investigate the impact of the financial sector reform on the 
financial development by using the new records of financial sector reform in 91 countries during 
1973-2005. Their study showed that financial development of one country depends on the level 
of legal system structure in the country. These scholars finalize their studies by concluding that 
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the effectiveness of the financial liberalization policy is highly depending on the political set up 
of that country.  
Hiro Ito 2005 in his study on “Financial Development and Financial Liberalization in Asia 
Thresholds, Institutions and the Sequence of Liberalization” he analyze the impact of the 
financial liberalization on the development of the financial sectors through two dimension. One 
is whether financial openness leads to financial development after controlling for the level of 
legal/institutional development and the other is whether trade opening is a precondition for the 
financial opening, focusing on Asia. In his study he used the panel data which includes 87 less 
developed countries over the period 1980 to 2000. His study suggested that for financial 
liberalization promote financial development the institutional structure of the country matter. In 
the same ways the opening of the trade sectors is the pre-condition for the effectiveness of the 
financial reform. The study also shows that the lower the level of corruption and higher the 
quality of laws and order facilitate the booming of the financial development in the country.  
 
Kevin Greenidge and Alvon Moore (2007) on there paper “The Impact of Financail Liberlization 
on the Financail Developemnt: Evidence from the Caribbean” they examines the relationbetween 
financail liberlization and financail development in a selected group of Caribbean countries. In 
there study they focus on the single country estimation approach because the success of 
liberlization policies largely depends on the instituional structure of the countries and thus is 
likely to be country- specific. The main finding of their studies focus on the direct effects of 
financail liberlaization on the financail development varied across the coutries and appears to 
reflect the pace at which such polices were implemented. Barbados took a very gradual approach 
to both domestic and international financial liberalization and the results suggest that both 
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dimensions of financail liberalization had a positive impact on the rate and equilibruim level of 
financail development. However, the reseaerch find out that in Jamaica where the paces of both 
domestic and internatioanl financial liberlization were quite rapid there appears to be no 
significant effects of financail liberlization on financail development. In Trinidad and Tobago, 
domestic financail liberlization occurred at a pace faster than in Barbados but much slower than 
in Jamaica and here the impacts were positive. On the contrary, international financail 
liberlization in Trinidad and Tobago took place at a pace just as rapid as in Jamaica and no 
significant effects were uncovered. They concluded that finanail liberlization policies can 
havedirect effects on the financail development, over and above that cuased by movements in the 
interest rate.  
All of the reviewed literature didn’t analyze the impact of financial liberalization on financial 
development with respect to time. Financial liberalization has different impacts on the financial 
development in the short run and long run. In addition to this, all research reviewed didn’t 
identify the promising sectors from financial liberalization indicator. Generally, the reviewed 
paper have the following research gaps: what are the immediate impacts of the financial 
liberalization on the development of the financial sectors? What is the long term impact of the 
financial liberalization on the development of the financial sectors?  Which financial 
liberalization policy is the promising?  
 
2.3. Financial institutions and Financial Liberalization in Ethiopia 
Financial institutions are the most important engines of economic growth for any economy in the 
world. According to Lakew (2000), banks are the dominant financial institutions in Ethiopia. 
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They account, on average, for 96 percent of total gross financial assets. Non-banks account only 
for about 4 percent. Financial institutions currently operating in the Ethiopian financial system 
comprise the central bank, commercial banks, specialized banks, insurance companies, pension 
fund, saving and credit cooperatives and Microfinance Institutions. The most important functions 
of commercial banks in the area of financial intermediation are deposit mobilization and lending 
activities.  
In Ethiopia the need for banks, Micro Finance Institutions and insurance companies is very 
crucial as there are no developed security markets. After the fall of the socialist government the 
new pro- capitalist regime introduced many financial liberalizations and restructuring measures 
to strengthen the financial sector by placing legal and regulatory frameworks. Due to the changes 
in the policies a number of private commercial banks, insurance companies and MFIs were 
established in the country sharing the former dominance of state owned financial institutions. 
The participation of private sectors in the economy has brought competition in the financial 
sector of the country. In the future the dominance of state owned financial institutions seem to 
cease though still the private banks look far chasing the public banks.  
2.3.1. The Pre-Reform Financial Sector 
The pre-reform period here refers to the period 1974 to 1991, which noted as the Derge regime. 
During this period all private banks were nationalized. The National Bank of Ethiopia was at the 
apex of the banking structure and was engaged in all the functions of central bank. As noted 
earlier, Commercial bank Ethiopia, Agriculture industry development bank, Development Bank 
of Ethiopia and Housing and saving Bank were in operation. In addition to these banks, there 
were also two other financial institutions: Ethiopian Insurance Corporation and the Pension and 
9 
 
Social Security Authority. The commercial banks of Ethiopia followed by the developmental 
bank of Ethiopia were the most important banks in the country both before and after reform. On 
average the commercial bank of Ethiopia alone comprises more than 90% of total deposit (while 
developmental bank of Ethiopia share is 1.3%), and 71% of the total loans advanced in which 
developmental bank of Ethiopia share being 16% (Alemayehu, 2006). 
2.3.2. The Policy Regime in the Pre-Reform Period: Financial Sector and Ideology 
In Ethiopian history the period from 1974-1991 is known as the dictator regime in which every 
national plan is controlled by the central government of the country. Both financial and 
economic plan of the country were highly controlled by the central governments. So, the 
National Bank of Ethiopia was established by the proclamation 1976 to facilitate the central 
controlling of the financial system in the country. According to proclamation 1976 article 6 
mentioned the role of the National Bank of Ethiopia which was fostering the balanced and 
accelerated economic development in the country. In this period, the National Bank of Ethiopia 
was actively involved in direct controlling of all financial institutions by (a) fixing both deposit 
and lending interest rates, (b) directly controlling the foreign exchange and credit allocation 
which was done in a discriminatory manner, by favoring the public sector, and (c) by directly 
financing government deficit (National Bank of Ethiopia, 1998). Bank supervision/regulation has 
been largely limited to on and off inspection on a few branches. The Derg regime is also 
characterized by an economic policy largely informed by the ideology of socialism.  
Furthermore, the Derg Socialized government controlled the foreign exchange earnings and 
credit allocation through the National Bank of Ethiopia. The National Bank of Ethiopia would 
allocate all the foreign exchange earning to socialize sectors. Similarly, credit allocation was 
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informed by the same ideological considerations. In consultation with the Ministry of Finance 
and the Planning Ministry, the National Bank of Ethiopia projects the financial planning of the 
economy. Based on some statistical survey it would determine the credit need of different sectors 
by favoring the priority investments. In credit allocation financial institutions used credit policy 
as a factor of strengthening and expanding the socialized sector and encouraging the 
socialization of others (Antonio, 1988: 71-72). This favoring of the socialized sector is shown by 
the fact that a good part of the banks resources were directed to the socialized sector (for instance 
68% of Agricultural Development Bank resources were allocated to State farms) and that the 
state farms and cooperatives were not required collateral when granted loans. As noted by 
Antonio (1988), this restrictive policy has resulted in excess liquidity in the banking sectors in 
the 1980 chiefly because of (a) the biased credit policy, (b) the collateral requirement on the 
private sector, (c) seasonal trends and the (then) existing economic condition as well as (d) The 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia’s inefficiency (Antonio, 1988). 
 
2.4. The Structure of the Financial System in Post-reform Period 
After the new government controlled the power there are many financial and economic reforms 
that took places in Ethiopia. The financial reform is started in 1991. The strategy that the country 
follows in the financial liberalization is the gradualism strategy. This strategy is highly criticized 
by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund because of its sluggish nature. But 
considering its immature financial system adopting the gradualism strategy is best choice for 
Ethiopia. The living standard of the society in the country is very low and its economic 
development is backward because of the civil war during the Derg regime. 
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To improve the living standard and condition of the society, the country government starts to 
implement financial and economic reform. In the country the structural reforms concentrated on 
lifting most domestic price controls, reducing import tariffs, and moving to a market-based 
system of foreign exchange allocation. Exchange-rate reform, began in October 1992 with a 
devaluation of 140 per cent from 2.07 Birr to the dollar (the rate at which it was fixed for nearly 
two decades) to 5 Birr to the dollar. The devaluation's size was justified by the substantial 
premium on the parallel market, which was 238 per cent at one point. A foreign exchange 
auction system was introduced in 1993 (Aron 1998). 
 
The financial and economic reform that Ethiopia implemented resulted in increasing the inflow 
of the financial aids in the support of the reconstruction and transitional program; Ethiopia was 
the first World Bank clients in the sub Saharan African country in 1998. From the 1993 to 1995 
the reform and reconstruction is highly supported by the World Bank structural adjustment 
program and International Monetary fund enhanced structural adjustment facility. In Ethiopia 
enhanced structural adjustment program launched in 1996 but it was stopped in 1997 because of 
the disagreement with the governments.  The main reasons for their disagreement are the huge 
share of the financial assets of the commercial bank of Ethiopia. The other is they require the 
government to open financial market for foreign financial institutions. Limitations on the 
operation of foreign exchange bureau were another source of disagreement (Stephen, 2001). 
 
2.4.1. The Four task of Managing Financial Reform 
Ethiopia experienced four steps in implementing the financial reforms (Stephen, 2001). This 
helps the country to pass different stages of the financial development and expansion.  
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1. Restructuring the Approach to financial liberalization; this steps aimed to transform 
the government sectors to focus on the management and achievement of output and 
outcome rather than focus on the management and achievements of input.  
2 Improving the scheme of the reform; this is the principle of add and drop. It focuses on 
fulfilling those elements that are missing and removing unessential parts.  
3 Managing the implementation of the reform; the stage of implementation has three 
minor steps: Design, Pilot and operation. In the case of Ethiopia, the design step involved 
an assessment of the existing system and the context of the system. Assessment was 
followed by a detailed procedural design and consultation with federal and regional 
partners. The second phase of implementing a financial reform involves testing the 
design through a pilot. Once a pilot is tested, implementation is expanded to full scale 
operation. With the completion of this third phase, the reform is fully implemented into 
practice.  
4 Protecting the reform; Ethiopia is simultaneously implementing devolution, civil 
service reform and sector development programmers (decentralization support activity 
project, 1998). Each reform on its own is a challenge. While ultimately complementary, 
the reforms have different objectives and the different time frames. Devolution is the 
broadest and most comprehensive reform for it involves the transfer of political and 
administrative authority to regional and sub-regional governments. The civil service 
reform is introducing fundamental administrative and management change to make 
governments at all levels more efficient and effective.  
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2.5. The outcome of Financial Reform 
One of the major changes of the financial liberalization policy in Ethiopia is in the banking 
industry. In 1994 the government of Ethiopia designs one proclamation which allows the 
Ethiopian private sectors to invest in banking industry. This proclamation resulted in the 
dramatic changes in the banking sectors in Ethiopia. In 2010 the number of the private 
commercial bank is around 17 and three government owned banks. During the same fiscal year, 
289 new bank branches were opened by commercial bank of Ethiopia raising the total branch 
network in the country to 970 from 681 last year. As a result, the bank to people ratio declined 
from 117,474 people to 82,474 in 2010/11. Even if the banking system in the country improved 
still the share of the government owned banking sectors is larger than the private banks. 
(National Bank of Ethiopia, 2010/2011). Because of this proclamation there are also radical 
changes in the sectors of insurances and microfinance institutions. In 2010/11 there are 14 new 
insurances company in the country. The number of the branches is 221 in the same year. On the 
other hand before 1991 there is no microfinance institution in Ethiopia. But after financial reform 
policy implemented there are around 31 microfinance institutions in Ethiopia. Their total capital 
increased by 24 percent to Birr 2.9 billion and their assets rose by 27.6 percent to Birr 10.2 
billion mirroring their ever growing rose in the economy.  
In Ethiopia still the banking industry is highly controlled by the state owned banking sectors. But 
on the implementation private bank is more effective and efficient than the government owned 
banking sectors (Alemayehu, 2007). As in many developing countries the financial institutions in 
Ethiopia provide very limited services. The banking sector faces a number of problems that 
hindered its proper functioning. Liquidity problems are widely seen which make the private 
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the country. Before financial liberalization there is no private bank. This makes the commercial 
bank of Ethiopia as the monopoly banks in the country. But the story was changed after 1992. In 
the country there are around 17 new private banks in the year 2011. The total branches of 
commercial bank are more than 970 (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2010).  
 
Financial development is the institutional set up that allows the efficient intermediation and 
effective financial markets. As the financial institutions in the country are stronger, it offers 
effective risk diversification and capital allocations. In addition to this it mobilize huge saving 
capacity as well as funding for big projects. Financial development can be measured by a number 
of factors including the depth, size, access and soundness of financial system. It can be measured 
by examining the performance and activities of the financial markets, banks, bond markets and 
financial institutions. In generally, as the financial development of the country is higher it can 
provide efficient and effective financial services.  
Tony and Alemayehu (2002) on their paper’s “Ethiopia’s New Financial Sector and Its 
Regulation” explained what Ethiopia can learn from transitional experiences elsewhere. They 
explained diverse directionality of the development in the market oriented economic 
development. The study showed that there is no one true path to market economy.  
Ebisa (2012) on his paper of “The Effects of the Post 1991 Era Financial Sector Deregulations in 
Ethiopia: An inspirational Guide for Agribusiness”, found out the impact of financial reform on 
the financial institution. The financial liberalization policy in Ethiopia resulted in the investment 
in banking sectors by Ethiopia citizen, the development of the insurances companies and 
establishment of the Micro Finance institutions. In his study he concluded that for development 
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of the economy of the country the financial institution of Ethiopia should invest in modern way 
on the agricultural sectors.  
 
Kozo, Barbara and Robert on their paper the case for the financial sector liberalization in 
Ethiopia; clearly found out that the nature of financial system in the country in which there is no 
foreign participation, evidence of a non-competitive market structure and strong capital controls. 
They also compare and contrast that the Ethiopia’s state owned and private banks noting that 
state owned banks were comparatively inefficient relative to private banks. In their research they 
found out that the financial liberalization has significant benefits that it may induce. In pursuing 
liberalization, the stakeholders’ concerns need to be acknowledged and addressed with 
references especially to improvements of financial regulations and oversight. They concluded 
that the financial liberalization is not a panacea for Ethiopia’s broader economic problems. But it 
may nonetheless serve to ameliorate these problems by improving the efficiency of the banking 
system and providing the basis for greater financial intermediation and economic growth.  
 
Stephen (2001) on his study of “Financial Reform in a Devolved African Country: Lessons from 
Ethiopia” found out that financial reform is not simply a slogan or a concept. He found out that 
reform is a multidimensional process that can’t be solved by introducing a single solution, be it 
double entry accounting, output/outcome budgeting or medium- term expenditure frameworks. 
He mention the basic requirement for the effective implementation of financial reforms require 
that political commitments, administrative capacity and significant financial and human 
resources. It also takes the long time for effective implementation. The researcher also found out 
the objective of financial development in Ethiopia. He mentioned that the objective of Ethiopia’s 
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financial reform should not be to win the international reform sweepstakes but to build sound 
financial system through a coherent, appropriate and feasible reform. The researcher concluded 
his research by highly recommending the importance of financial reform through sharing the 
Goran Hyden Penned idea that there are no shortcuts to progress in Africa (Hyden, 1983).  
 
All of the reviewed research literature conducted in Ethiopia financial liberalization cases have 
some common weakness. First all paper uses simple methodology in which it is difficult to know 
the short run and the long run impact of financial liberalization on the development of financial 
sectors. Second, all focus on outcome of per and post financial liberalization. Comparing only 
the outcome of pre and post liberalization is not important for the policy designer to effectively 
design practical and achievable policy in the financial liberalization area. In general, what we 
noticed is that the financial liberalization issues are the new concepts not only in the government 
organization but also in the academic, research institute and for the researcher. So, from 
reviewed researches the following main research gap identified: First identifying the most 
potential area in financial liberalization in Ethiopia context is most important for policy designer. 
Second analyzing the short run and the long run impact of the financial liberalization is 
important to know direct impact of financial liberalization for the development of the financial 
sectors. 
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3. Methods and Methodology 
3.1. Model specification: 
To examine the effect of financial liberalization on financial development, the study used the 
bound testing approach for co integration within the framework of Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) Pesaran (2001). The model specifies the Financial Depth as a function of financial 
liberalization:     
(Findepth) t= F (Fin. Liberalization, gdpg, inf.) t ------------------------------------1  
Findepth = financial depth, Fin. Liberalization= financial liberalization (financial reform) 
GDPG= annual growth rate of GDP and inf. = annual inflation rate. By recalling the basic form 
of an ARDL regression model: (http://davegiles.blogspot.kr/2013/06/ardl-models-part-ii-bounds-
tests.html)           
(Findepth)t = β0 + β1(Findepth)t-1 + .....+ βk(Findepth)t-p + γ0(fin. liberalization)t + γ1(fin. 
liberalization)t-1 + ....... + γi(fin. liberalization)t-i + δ0(gdpg)t + δ1 (gdpg)t-1 +….. +  
δi (gdpg)t-i  + µ0(inf.)t + µ1(inf.)t-1+ ……+ µi(inf.)t-i+Vt  ………….………………2 
µ, γ, δ, β = Coefficients to be estimated and vt = Error term assumed to be white noise. There are 
several reasons for the use of ARDL model for bound test. First this model is more appropriate 
for small sample size (Pesaran and Tang 2001). Second unit root test is not mandatory. Third, 
bound testing could be implemented regardless of whether the underlying variables are I (0), I 
(1). But in case of I (2), ARDL technique crashes and it yields spurious results.  
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With respect to Equation (2) it is assumed that there is a long-run relationship among the 
financial development and financial reform policy. As the direction of long-run relationship 
among the variables is unknown, a prior, the following unrestricted error correction model 
(UECM) can be regressed for determination of long-run relationship: 
Δ(findepth)t = α + ∑Ni=1βΔ(findepth)t-i + ∑Ni=0γiΔ(Fin. Liberalization)t-i + ∑Ni=0δiΔ(gdpg)t-i + 
∑Ni=0µΔ(Inf.)t-i + ѱ1(findepth)t-1 + ѱ2(Fin. Liberalization)t-1 + ѱ3(gdpg)t-1 + ѱ4(inf.)t-1 + vt--------
------------------------------------------------------------------------3 
Where ‘∆’ is first difference operator, ψi = Coefficients to be estimated and vt = Error term 
assumed to be white noise, ‘i’ is the number of lags, ‘n’ is the optimal lags length. The F-test is 
used for validating of long-run relationship. The null hypothesis for no long-run relationship 
amongst the variables in equation (3) is 
 (H0: ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3 = ψ4 =0)  
Against the alternative hypothesis  
(H1: ψ1 ≠ ψ2 ≠ ψ3 ≠ ψ4≠ 0).  
Two critical values [I (0) and I (1)] are taking from the Pesaran (2001) table. The decision for 
rejection or acceptance of null hypothesis depending whether, the calculated t value is greater 
than Pesaran critical value or not. If it is greater than the upper critical value, the null hypothesis 
will be rejected on the other hand it will be accepted, if it is less than the lower critical value. The 
result is inconclusive if it is between the upper and lower critical value (Younguck and 
Muhammed, 2012). To find the maximum number of lags for all variables, (n+1) r number of 
regressions will be estimated. Where ‘n’ is the maximum number of lags and ‘r’ is the number of 
variables in the equation. For annual data the maximum lag selected is 2 following the Pesaran 
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1997. The optimal model can be selected using Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). Once we 
prove the existence of the long run relationships, the long-run model can be estimated as follows 
(http://davegiles.blogspot.kr/2013/06/ardl-models-part-ii-bounds-tests.html). 
(Findepth)t = Ω0 + Ω1(Fin.Liberalization)t +  Ω2(gdpg)t + Ω3(Inf.)t + Vt---------------------4 
The short run model used to prove the diagnostic test and stability of the model. The error 
correction of co integration representation of the series can be specified as follow; 
Δ(findepth)t = ρ0+ ∑Ni=1ΔΠ(findepth)t-i + ∑Ni=0ΔΘ(Fin. Liberalization)t-i + ∑Ni=0ΔΩ(gdpg)t-i 
+ ∑Ni=0ΔΨ(inf.)t-i + λECTt-1 + Vt------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5 
Where Πi, Θi, Ωi, Ψi, and Фi, are coefficients of short-run dynamic parameters and λ captures the 
speed of adjustment and tells us how much of the adjustment to equilibrium takes place each 
period.  
3.2. Data Description 
The country selected for this study is Ethiopia. The data in this study cover the financial reforms 
conducted from 1973 up to 2005.The main sources of the data are Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development, National Bank of Ethiopia, the World Bank Database for the Financial 
Development Indicators and the new data base of the Financial Reforms – Abdul Abiad, Enrica 
Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel- International Monetary Fund for the financial reform 
indicators.  
In my study the dependent variable is the depths of financial development indicators which it can 
be measure in terms of three financial development indicators. Deposit money bank assets to 
GDP (%) (gfddd02), Bank private credit to GDP (%) (gfddd101) and Private credit by deposit 
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money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%) (gfddd112).The bank private credit to 
the GDP (%) (gfdddi12) measures the financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a share of GDP. 
Deposit Money Bank assets to the GDP (%) (gfdddi02) is the total assets held by deposit money 
banks as a share of GDP. Assets include claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector which 
includes central, state and local governments, nonfinancial public enterprises and private sector. 
Deposit money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept 
transferable deposits, such as demand deposits. Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP, calculated using the following deflation method: 
{(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is deposit money bank claims, P_e is end-
of period CPI, and P_a is average annual CPI. 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP, calculated using 
the following deflation method: {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is credit to 
the private sector, P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a is average annual CPI.  
The independent variables are the financial liberalization indicators. They are credit controls and 
excessively high reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, State ownership in 
the banking sectors, capital account restriction, supervision of the banking sectors and security 
market policy as well as the overall financial reform measures and the financial reform index 
normalized. The detail coding process is explained on the appendix. The study used the e-views 
and STATA.  
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According to table 2 the correlation matric showed that most of the variables move in the same 
direction with some exceptionality. Specifically the correlation between the inflation and all 
other variables showed inflation moves in the opposite direction. 
 
 Table 2; The Correlation Matrix 
 Gfdd
di01 
Gfdd
di02 
Gfdd
di12 
credi
ts 
intrat Entr
y 
bank
ing 
Intal
cap 
secur
ity 
Finre
from 
Finre
form
_n 
Gdp
g  
Inf 
Gfdddi01 1.0             
Gfdddi02 0.66
95 
1.0            
Gfdddi12 0.62
88 
0.68
57 
1.0           
Credit 0.82
32 
0.85
20 
0.68
57 
1.0          
Intr 0.83
96 
0.77
47 
0.75
01 
0.74
0 
1.0         
Entry  0.54
66 
0.20
71 
0.06
44 
0.48
37 
0.32
88 
1.0        
Banking 0.91
84 
0.83
89 
0.73
48 
0.86
30 
0.85
79 
0.38
33 
1.0       
Intalcap 0.56
44 
0.46
71 
0.31
37 
0.52
99 
0.65
00 
0.47
49 
0.54
40 
1.0      
Secu 0.77
31 
0.61
81 
0.52
44 
0.71
10 
0.79
67 
0.56
47 
0.75
10 
0.87
56 
1.0     
Finreform 0.87
68 
0.71
70 
0.52
99 
0.87
23 
0.82
12 
0.71
27 
0.84
68 
0.79
09 
0.92
97 
1.0    
Finreform_n 0.87
68 
0.71
70 
0.52
99 
0.87
23 
0.82
12 
0.71
27 
0.84
68 
0.79
09 
0.92
97 
1.00
00 
1.0   
Gdpg 0.24
75 
0.18
92 
-
0.09
50 
0.27
49 
0.21
02 
0.13
14 
0.30
31 
0.21
96 
0.18
86 
0.25
40 
0.25
40 
1.0  
Inf -
0.29
87 
-
0.31
65 
-
0.13
13 
-
0.30
02 
-
0.32
11 
-
0.18
40 
-
0.42
35 
-
0.26
00 
-
0.26
91 
-
0.33
20 
-
0.33
20 
-
0.67
72 
1.0 
Source: Author estimation 
 
From table two, standard deviation showed that inflation is the major that fluctuates with the 
comparison of the mean of the variables. It also showed that the finance reform index is the one 
which has the lowest deviation from the mean. The sample size form this study is 33 years from 
1973-2005.  
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Table 3;  Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Observation Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
GFDDDI01 33 8.794449 6.088997 2.31288 19.072 
GFDDDI02 33 16.91564 3.613757 9.89799 23.9202 
GFDDDI12 33 19.41673 7.025185 0 33.3986 
CREDITCONTROL0 33 0.818181 0.917011 0 2 
INTRACONTROL 33 0.242424 0.4351941 0 1 
ENTRYBARRIERS  33 0.545454 0.7941545 0 3 
BANKINGSUPERV 33 0.303030 0.4666937 0 1 
PRIVATIZATION 33 0.030303 0.1740777 0 1 
INTLCAPITAL 33 0.181818 0.3916747 0 1 
SECURITYMARKETS 33 0.454545 0.7537784 0 2 
FINREFROM 33 2.575757 3.1822784 0 8 
FINREFROM_N 33 0.122655 0.1515369 0 0.380952 
GDPG 33 2.839901 6.183238 -11.1443 13.8596 
INF 33 6.616519 10.42723 -17.6274 35.7226 
Source: Authors Estimation 
 
Chart one indicated that the progress of financial development indicators in the year 1973-2005. 
Especially after financial liberalization implemented in Ethiopia in 1991 the financial 
development is increasing at increasing rates.  
Fig. 4 The mean and standard deviation  
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Unit root tests 
Even though the ARDL approach for co integration testing does not require the pre-testing of the 
variables for the unit root, it is imperative that this test is conducted to ensure that the series are 
not integrated of the order higher than one. The result for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) is 
presented on table four. As showed on this table all of the variables except privatization are 
stationery. These implies that the ARDL approach of co integration testing technique can be 
applied as it is confirmed that the complex nature of dependent and independent variables by 
having I (0) and I (1) from the table four can be compromised by ARDL model.   
 
Table 4; Unit root tests 
No Variables  ADF tests statistics  
 
Criteria  Conclusion  
Level  First 
differences  
1 Gfdddi01 -1.002433 -2.296502** None I(1) 
2 Gfdddio2 -3.880658** - Intercept and 
trend  
I(0) 
3 Gfdddi12 -3.645956** - Intercept and 
trend  
I(0) 
4 Creditcontrol0 -0.398174 -4.414533* Intercepts  I(1) 
5 Intracontrol -0.493435 -3.872983* Intercepts  I(1) 
6 Entrybarriers -5.249229* - Intercepts  I(0) 
7 Bankingsuperv -0.596285 -3.872983* Intercepts I(1) 
8 Intalcapital -0.402961 -4.416153* Intercepts I(1) 
9 Securitymarkets 0.330448 -4.874567* Intercepts I(1) 
10 Finreform1 -0.275758 -6.919787* Intercepts I(1) 
11 Finreform_n -0.275758 -6.919787* Intercepts I(1) 
12 Gdpg -5.416806* - Intercepts I(0) 
13 Inf.  -3.597927* - Intercepts I(0) 
Source: Author estimation 
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4.2. Existences of the Long Run relationships 
On the ARDL analysis the first step is to determine the existences of the long run relationships 
among the variables. The computed F-statistics together with the critical values computed by 
pesaran et.al (2001) are shown in table 5, 6, and 7. On table five, for credit control and reserve 
requirements, finance reform and the finance reform index the computed F-statistics is higher 
than the upper bound critical value at ten percent significance level. Whereas for liberalization in 
entry barriers, banking supervision, interest rate control, capital account restriction and security 
markets, the computed F-statistics is higher than the critical value from the Pesaran et.al (2000) 
at five percent significance level. So, the null hypothesis is rejected. This establishes that there is 
a long run relationship among the dependent variables-Bank private credit to GDP (%) (gfdddi01) 
and the other explanatory variables.  
 
Table 5;  F-tests to check the existences of the long run relationship 
Model  Long run relation 
test between 
gfdddi01 
Specificati
on  
Computed 
F-statistics 
Level of 
significances 
Critical values 
(unrestricted 
intercept and 
unrestricted 
trend) 
Critical 
values 
(unrestricted 
intercept) 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Model one  Creditcontrol0,   Intercept   4.32* 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model two  Intracontrol,   Intercept   4.37** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model three  Entrybarriers,  Intercept  4.54** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model four  Bankingsuperv,  Intercept  5.32** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model five  Intlcapital1,   Intercept  4.50** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model six  Securitymarkets,  Intercept 
and trend  
5.95** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model Finreform1,  Intercept     1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
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Table 6 shows the existence of the long run relationship between deposit money bank assets to 
the GDP (%) with financial liberalization indicators. According to this table all the financial 
liberalization indicators has the long run relationship with the deposit money bank assets to GDP 
(%). For Credit control, policies on the security markets and financial reform the computed F-
statistics of each variable is higher than the upper bound critical value at ten percent significance 
level. Whereas for the other variables computed F-statistics is higher than the upper bound 
critical value at five percent significance level. So, in both case the null hypothesis of non-
existences of long run relationships can be rejected. 
 
seven  3.94*** 
 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model eight  Finreform_n,  Intercept  3.79* 
 
 
 
1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
- Where ***, ** and * indicates one percent, five percent and ten percent significance level.  
- Note the growth of the GDP and annual inflation rate is considered as controlled variable in all model  
- The dependent variable is gfdddi01  
- Source: Author estimation 
Table 6; F-tests to test for the existences of the long run relation 
Model  Long run 
relation test 
between 
gfdddi02--- 
Specification Computed 
F-statistics 
Level of 
significances 
Critical values 
(unrestricted 
intercept and 
unrestricted trend) 
Critical values 
(unrestricted 
intercept) 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Model one  Creditcontrol0 Intercept and 
trend  
7.86*
** 
 
 
1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model two Bankingsuperv Intercept and 
trend  
6.34** 
 
1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model three  Intlcapital1 Intercept and 
trend   
5.41** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model four Securitymarkets Intercept and 
trend  
4.79* 
 
1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model five Entrybarriers Intercept  5.26** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
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On table seven all the financial liberalization indicators has the long run relationship with private 
credit by deposit money bank and other financial institution to the GDP (%). For all the financial 
liberalization indicators the computed F- statistics is higher than the upper bound critical values 
at five percent significance level except the policy for the security markets which is significant at 
one percent significance level. So, the null hypothesis of the non-existence of the long run 
relationship can be rejected.  
 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model six  Intracontrol Intercept and 
trend    
6.19** 
 
1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model 
seven   
Finreform1 Intercept and 
trend   
4.74* 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model 
Eight  
Finreform_n Intercept and 
trend  
5.81** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
- Where ***, ** and * indicates one percent, five percent and ten percent significance level. 
- Note the growth of the GDP and annual inflation rate is considered as controlled variable in 
all model. 
- The dependent variable is gfdddi02  
- Source: Author estimation 
Table 7; F-tests to test for the existences of the long run relation 
Model  Long run 
relation test 
between 
gfdddi12 
Specification Computed 
F-statistics 
Level of 
significances 
Critical values 
(unrestricted 
intercept and 
unrestricted 
trend) 
Critical 
values 
(unrestricted 
intercept) 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Model one  Creditcontrol0,   Intercept and 
trend  
5.75** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model two Bankingsuperv Intercept and 
trend  
4.54* 
 
1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model three  Intlcapital1 Intercept and 
trend   
5.43** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model four Intracontrol Intercept and 
trend    
6.53** 
 
1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
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4.3. The Long run Estimate 
 
4.3.1. The long run Estimates on Bank private credit to GDP (gfdddi01) 
Table eight shows the long run relationships between Bank private credits to GDP (%) and 
financial liberalization indicators. All financial liberalization indictors are statistically significant 
at one percent significance level. One level increase in liberalization in credit control and 
excessive reserve requirements, interest rate control, entry barrier, banking supervision, capital 
account restriction, and policy for the security markets, overall financial reform and financial 
reform index normalized increase the development of bank private credit to the GDP (%)by 5.41, 
11.52, 3.99, 12.36, 8.42, 6.09, 1.66 and 34.92percent,respectively. Constant has also positive and 
statistically significant impact on the development of the financial sectors through booming the 
bank private credit to the GDP (%). In all case the GDP growth rate and annual inflation growth 
rate have insignificant impacts on the development on the financial sectors. Liberalization in the 
Banking supervision is the most effective and efficient financial liberalization policy in Ethiopia. 
 
 
 
Model five  Entrybarriers Intercept  5.59** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model six  Securitymarkets Intercept and 
trend  
7.36*
** 
 
 
1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model 
seven  
Finreform1  Intercept and 
trend   
6.35** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
Model eight  Finreform_n Intercept and 
trend  
6.03** 1% 5.17 6.36 4.29 5.61 
5% 4.01 5.07 3.23 4.35 
10% 3.47 4.45 2.72 3.77 
- Where ***, ** and * indicates one percent, five percent and ten percent significance level.  
- The growth of the GDP and annual inflation growth rate is considered as controlled variable in all 
models.   
- The dependent variable is gfdddi12  
- Source: Author estimation 
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Table 8; The long run relationship gfdddi01 and independent variables 
Model  Variables  Coefficient Std Error  R-square  Adj. R2 
Model one   
(1, 0, 1, 1) 
C 4.52*** 1.236010  
0.67 
 
0.64 CREDITCONTROL0 5.41*** 0.727694
GDPG 0.002738 0.132449
INF -0.021858 0.084658
      
Model two   
(1,2,2,2) 
C 5.85*** 1.105227  
0.68 
 
0.680230INTRACONTROLS 11.51*** 1.434612
GDPG 0.067495 0.124439
INF -0.006237 0.080539
      
Model three   
(1,0,0,0) 
C 6.30*** 1.737997 0.27 0.27  
ENTRYBARRIERS 3.99*** 1.179229
GDPG 0.158723 0.187876
INF -0.018986 0.122499
      
Model four 
(1,0,0,0)  
C 4.37*** 0.820942 0.86 0.84 
BANKINGSUPERV 12.35*** 0.989850
GDPG 0.032968 0.088730
INF 0.077463 0.058089
      
Model five   
(2,2,2,2) 
C 7.72*** 1.599601 0.35 0.28 
INTLCAPITAL1 8.42*** 2.400054
GDPG 0.051669 0.189973
INF -0.080679 0.121011
    
Model six  
(2,0,0,0) 
C 6.40*** 1.258423 0.62 0.58 
SECURITYMARKET1 6.09*** 0.947735
GDPG 0.042058 0.144188
INF -0.066330 0.092571
      
Model seven  
(1,0,0,0) 
C 4.56*** 1.030621 0.77 0.75 
FINREFORM1 1.66*** 0.176592
GDPG 0.014215 0.111662
INF -0.013122 0.071720
 
Model eight  
(1,0,1,0) 
C 4.56*** 1.030621 0.72 0.68 
FINREFORM_N 34.92*** 3.708445
GDPG 0.014215 0.111662
INF -0.013122 0.071720
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Table 9; Short run model for gfdddi01 and independent variables 
Model  Variables  Coefficients  Std, Error Sample size Adj. R2 
Model 
One  
(1, 0, 1, 1) 
C -0.042148 0.202037  
31 
 
0.54   D(gfdddi01(-1)) 0.97*** 0.188338 
D(creditcontrol0) 1.140142 0.887131
D(gdpg) -0.032203 0.036381 
D(gdpg(1)) 0.052564 0.033881
D(inf) -0.041885 0.025906 
D(inf(1)) -0.019152 0.025277
ECM(cred01) -.80*** 0.265678 
   
Model two  
(1,2,2,2) 
C -0.119973 0.180991 30 0.63 
D(GFDDDI01(1)) 0.64*** 0.128348 
D(INTRACONTROLS) 3.285299** 0.992596 
D(INTRACONTROLS(2)) 3.79*** 1.062521 
D(GDPG(1)) -0.007445 0.022619 
D(GDPG(2)) -0.033062 0.035437 
D(INF) 0.026161 0.019535 
D(INF(2)) -0.016728 0.018376 
D(ECMCONT01(1)) -0.160786** 0.093427 
      
Model 
three  
(1,0,0,0) 
C 0.161081 0.235298 31 0.33 
D(GFDDDI01(-1)) 0.59*** 0.150943 
D(ENTRYBARRIERS) 0.472577 0.427847 
D(GDPG) -0.017338 0.035579 
D(INF) -0.014299 0.022929 
ECMBARRI01(-1) -0.099071* 0.051853 
      
Model 
four  
(1,0,0,0) 
C -0.018849 0.205693 31 0.49  
D(GFDDDI01(-1)) 0.42*** 0.137211 
D(BANKINGSUPERV) 4.65*** 1.309011 
D(GDPG) -0.019826 0.030510 
D(INF) 0.008244 0.020958 
ECMBANK01(-1) -0.205967** 0.096245 
      
Model five  
(2,2,2,2) 
C 0.072473 0.257697 30 0.26 
 
 
D(GFDDDI01(-1)) 0.562416** 0.210338 
D(GFDDDI01(-2)) 0.225050 0.243144 
D(INTLCAPITAL1(-2)) 0.416946 0.980859 
D(GDPG(-2)) 0.009624 0.039875 
D(INF(-2)) 0.013382 0.025136 
ECMCAPI01(-1) -0.101014* 0.062059 
-  Source Author estimation 
- Where ***, ** and * indicates one percent, five percent and ten percent significance level. 
32 
 
 
4.3.2. The long run Estimates of Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP (gfdddi02) 
Table ten shows the long run impact of the financial liberalization policy on the development of 
the financial sectors in Ethiopia. According to the results on this table all financial liberalization 
policy has statistically significant and positive impacts on the development of the financial 
sectors. All are statistically significant at one percent significance level. Increasing the 
liberalization of the credit control and excess reserve requirements, entry barriers, supervision of 
the banking sectors, capital account restriction, policy for the security markets, overall financial 
reform measures and financial reform index normalized by one level enhance the development of 
the financial sectors through booming deposit money bank assets to the GDP (%) by 6.58, 0.76, 
12.87, 8.26, 5.66, 1.56 and 32.74 percent, respectively. In all model constant has positive and 
statistically significant impacts on the development of the financial sectors in Ethiopia. 
Table (9); Short run Estimation for Bank private credit to the GDP (%) 
Model  Variables  Coefficients  Std, Error Sample size Adj. R2 
Model six  
(2,0,0,0) 
C 0.082491 0.263935 30 0.27 
D(GFDDDI01(-1)) 0.58*** 0.208801 
D(GFDDDI01(-2)) 0.150480 0.226516 
D(SECURITYMARKET1) 0.697323 1.172048 
D(GDPG) -0.027351 0.037726 
D(INF) -0.022788 0.024852 
ECMSECU01(-1) -0.147167* 0.090813 
      
Model seven  
(1,0,0,0) 
C 0.117985 0.220698 31 0.43 
D(GFDDDI01(-1)) 0.54*** 0.150378 
D(FINREFORM1) 0.489845 0.321488 
D(GDPG) -0.027041 0.032414 
D(INF) -0.017649 0.021110 
ECMFIN01(-1) -0.215390** 0.084919 
      
Model eight  
(1,0,1,0) 
C 0.081760 0.212144 31 0.47 
   
D(GFDDDI01(-1)) 0.58*** 0.146888 
D(FINREFORM_N) 9.664774 6.506978 
D(GDPG(-1)) 0.043054 0.026275 
D(INF) -0.014202 0.016957 
ECMFIN_N01(-1) -0.198674** 0.082319 
- Where ***, ** and * indicates one percent, five percent and ten percent significance level.  
- The dependent variable is Bank private Credit to the GDP (%) (gfdddi01) 
- Source authors Estimation  
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Liberalization in the banking supervision is the most effective and efficient financial 
liberalization policy in booming the development of the deposit money bank assets the GDP (%). 
 
 
 
 
Table 10; Long run relationship between gfdddi02 and independent variables 
Model  Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  R-square  Adj. R2
Model one  
(2, 0, 0 , 0) 
C 15.47*** 1.266218 0.74 0.72 
CREDITCONTROL0 6.57*** 0.745479
GDPG -0.170938 0.135686
INF -0.127192 0.086727
      
Model two  
(1,2,2,2) 
C 8.60*** 0.690567  
0.95 
 
0.95 @TREND 0.715*** 0.030011
ENTRYBARRIERS 0.753790** 0.350085
GDPG -0.19*** 0.056500
INF -0.064309* 0.036407
      
Model three  
(1,1,1 ,2) 
C 16.04*** 1.333571  
0.71 
 
0.67 BANKINGSUPERV 12.86*** 1.607951
GDPG -0.106536 0.144136
INF -0.029424 0.094361
      
Model four  
(1,2,2,2) 
C 19.58*** 1.949091  
0.19 
 
0.27 INTLCAPITAL1 8.25*** 2.924431
GDPG -0.078323 0.231479
INF -0.192444 0.147450
      
Model five  
(1,1,1,1)   
C 18.40*** 1.775865  
0.42 
 
0.37 SECURITYMARKET1 5.66*** 1.337428
GDPG -0.080119 0.203475
INF -0.177793 0.130635
    
Model six  
(1, 0, 0, 2) 
C 16.66*** 1.693271 0.54 0.49 
FINREFORM1 1.55*** 0.290135
GDPG -0.107552 0.183456
INF -0.128004 0.117833
    
 
Model seven  
 
C 16.66*** 1.693271 0.54 0.49 
FINREFORM_N 32.74*** 6.092831
GDPG -0.107552 0.183456
INF -0.128004 0.117833
Source Author estimation 
Where ***, ** and * indicates one percent, five percent and ten percent significance level. 
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Table 11; Short run Estimation for Deposit Money bank assets to the GDP (%) 
Model  Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error Sample size Std. error  
 
Model one 
(2, 0, 0 , 0)  
C 0.638531* 0.376580  
30 
 
0.25 D(GFDDDI02(-1)) 0.026358 0.175578 
D(GFDDDI02(-2)) -0.078602 0.234734 
D(CREDITCONTROL0) 1.331459 1.371485 
D(GDPG) -0.111509* 0.046539 
D(INF) -0.011356 0.031383 
ECMCRED02(-1) -0.244664** 0.107047 
      
 
Model two 
(1,2,2,2) 
C 0.739995 0.745666  
30 
 
0.09  @TREND -0.012630 0.037035 
D(GFDDDI02(-1)) 0.226616 0.203575 
D(ENTRYBARRIERS(-
2)) 
0.237817 0.575503 
D(GDPG(-2)) -0.036920** 0.047292 
D(INF(-2)) -0.083161** 0.029617 
 ECMENT02(-1) -0.715072** 0.260779   
      
 
Model three 
(1,1,1 ,2) 
C 0.378428 0.347072  
30 
 
0.20 D(GFDDDI02(-1)) 0.165704 0.245266 
D(BANKINGSUPER) -0.695398 2.008749 
D(BANKINGSUPER(1) 3.714177 1.858637 
D(GDPG(-1)) 0.054334 0.048021 
D(INF(-2)) -0.054762* 0.027272 
ECMBANK02(-1) -0.136817* 0.094901 
      
 
Model four 
(1,2,2,2) 
C 0.536424 0.338607  
30 
 
0.22 D(GFDDDI02(-1)) 0.055949 0.192796 
D(INTLCAPITAL1) 2.373421 1.966275 
D(INTLCAPITAL1(-2)) 1.740282 1.290545 
D(GDPG) -0.087517 0.063994 
D(GDPG(-2)) -0.075178 0.054811 
D(INF) 0.003342 0.032709 
D(INF(-2)) -0.042383 0.037918 
ECMINTLCP02(-1) -0.115447* 0.068646 
- ***, ** and * indicates one, five and ten percent level of significances level   
- The dependent variable is Deposit money bank assets to the GDP (%) 
- Source Author estimation 
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4.3.3. The long run estimate on the Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP (gfdddi12) 
Table 12 shows the long run estimates between financial liberalization and the financial 
development indicators. All financial liberalization indicators have positive and statistically 
significant impacts on the development of the financial sectors. It is significant at one percent 
significance level. One level increasing in the liberalization of the credit control and excess 
reserve requirements, banking supervision, capital account restriction, interest rate controls, 
policy for security markets, overall financial reform measures and financial reform index 
normalized enhance the development of the financial sectors though booming the private credit 
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%) by 2.32, 6.49, 3.35, 6.62, 
2.71, 0.67 and 13.94 percent, respectively. In all model constant has positive and statistically 
significant impacts on the development of the financial sectors in Ethiopia. On the other hand, 
GDP growth rate has negative and statistically significant impacts on the development of the 
financial sectors. In this study the negative impacts of the GDP growth rate on the development 
of the financial sectors indicate that economic developments didn’t cause the financial 
Table 11; Short run Estimation for Deposit Money bank assets to the GDP (%) 
Model Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error Sample  Std. error 
 
Model five  
(1,1,1,1)   
C 0.329809 0.357389  
31 
 
0.30 D(GFDDDI02(-1)) 0.259134 0.231791 
D(SECURITYMARKET1) 1.268954 1.564522 
D(SECURITYMARKET1(-1)) 1.261400* 0.785321 
D(GDPG(-1)) 0.066429 0.054740 
D(INF(-1)) 0.000370 0.035456 
ECMSECMKT02(-1) -0.137732* 0.088504 
      
 
Model six  
(1, 0, 0, 2)  
C 0.216492 0.331481  
30 
 
0.38 D(GFDDDI02(-1)) 0.027519 0.162086 
D(FINREFORM1) 2.000264*** 0.685904 
D(GDPG) -0.053025 0.043578 
D(INF(-2)) -0.014972 0.029417 
ECMFNI02(-1) -0.229858** 0.094276 
- Source Author estimation 
- Where ***, ** and * indicates one percent, five percent and ten percent significance level. 
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development. Liberalization banking supervision and interest rate control are the most effective 
and efficient financial liberalization policy in booming the private credit by deposit money bank 
and other financial institution to the GDP (%). 
 
Table 12; Long run relation between the “gfdddi12” and dependent variables 
Model  Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error R-squared  Adj. R2
Model one  
(1, 0, 1and 1) 
 
C 16.05937*** 1.042138  
0.36 
 
0.29 CREDITCONTROL0 2.316284*** 0.613552 
GDPG -0.20605* 0.111674 
INF -0.060478 0.071379 
      
Model two   
(1, 2, 2 and 1) 
C 15.57862*** 0.751663  
0.65 
 
0.61 BANKINGSUPERV 6.494761*** 0.906316 
GDPG -0.208795** 0.081242 
INF -0.005084 0.053186 
      
Model three  
(1, 0, 0 and 0) 
C 17.45694*** 1.075991  
0.21 
 
0.17 INTLCAPITAL1 3.346505** 1.614425 
GDPG -0.180754 0.127787 
INF -0.084834 0.081399 
      
Model four  
(1, 0, 0, and 0) 
C 16.21812*** 0.732081  
0.64 
 
0.61 INTRACONTROLS 6.628441*** 0.950260 
GDPG -0.196904** 0.082426 
INF -0.046679 0.053348 
      
Model five   
(1, 0, 0 and 0 ) 
C 16.82549*** 0.976667  
0.34 
 
0.28 
 
 
SECURITYMARKET1 2.712128*** 0.735541 
GDPG -0.19179* 0.111905 
INF -0.079705 0.071845 
C 16.82549 0.976667 
      
Model six  
(1, 0, 0 and 0) 
C 16.19713*** 1.026347 o.35 0.28 
FINREFORM1 0.663772*** 0.175860 
GDPG -0.1961* 0.111199 
INF -0.057924 0.071422 
      
Model seven  
(1, 0, 0 0) 
C 16.19713*** 1.026347 0.35 0.29 
FINREFORM_N 13.93923*** 3.693065 
GDPG -0.1961* 0.111199 
INF -0.057924 0.071422 
- Where ***, ** and * indicates one percent, five percent and ten percent significance level.  
- Source Authors Estimation  
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Table 13; Short run relationship between “gfdddi12” and independent variables  
Model  Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  Sample  Adj. R2
Model one  
(1, 0, 1and 1) 
C 0.147713 0.294497  
31 
 
0.48 D(GFDDDI12(-1)) 0.446897*** 0.137021 
D(CREDITCONTROL0) 0.712922 1.267036 
D(GDPG) -0.131910*** 0.043042 
D(INF) 0.004825 0.029967 
ECMCRD12(-1) -0.320489*** 0.106920 
      
Model two  
(1, 2, 2 and 1) 
C 0.072466 0.351843  
30 
 
0.28  D(GFDDDI12(-1)) 0.376479** 0.176019 
D(BANKINGSUPERV(-2)) 2.208848 2.073532 
D(GDPG(-2)) 0.019564 0.049201 
D(INF) 0.051800 0.032493 
D(INF(-1)) -0.010120 0.033389 
ECMBANK12(-1) -0.330117** 0.167736 
      
Model three 
(1, 0, 0 and 0)  
C 0.185716 0.304189  
31 
 
0.42 D(GFDDDI12(-1)) 0.497107*** 0.151810 
D(INTLCAPITAL1) 0.528506 1.878838 
D(GDPG) -0.126087*** 0.045178 
D(INF) 0.000173 0.029845 
ECMINCPT12(-1) -0.285756** 0.113187 
      
Model four  
(1, 0, 0, and 0) 
C 0.102667 0.273584  
31 
 
0.52 D(GFDDDI12(-1)) 0.516512*** 0.146602 
D(INTRACONTROLS) 3.428224** 1.654298 
D(GDPG) -0.154377*** 0.043511 
D(INF) -0.003224 0.027172 
ECMINCONT12(-1) -0.543643*** 0.153027 
      
Model five  
(1, 0, 0 and 0 ) 
C 0.247860 0.287861 31 0.49 
 
 
 
 
D(GFDDDI12(-1)) 0.519015*** 0.140699 
D(SECURITYMARKET1) 0.203028 1.198324 
D(GDPG) -0.141303*** 0.042915 
D(INF) -0.006330 0.027905 
ECMSEC12(-1) -0.409551*** 0.117917 
- ***, ** and * indicates one, five and ten percent level of significances   
- The dependent variable is Deposit money bank assets to the GDP (%) 
- Source authors Estimation  
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Generally in this study all the financial liberalization policy have positive and statistically 
significant impacts on the development of the financial sectors in the long run. Liberalization in 
banking supervision is the most effective and efficient financial liberalization policy in booming 
the financial development in the Ethiopia. The policy recommendation from the long run 
estimate is that the Ethiopia governments should have to give much attention in full liberalization 
of the financial sectors of Ethiopia.  
 
4.4. The Short Run Estimate 
In the short run the coefficient of Error Correction Term (ECTt-1) measures the speed of 
adjustments towards the long run equilibrium. The magnitude or the coefficients of the ECM 
shows the probability of the disequilibrium from the previous year’s shock converge back to the 
long run equilibrium in the current year. Specifically its value should be negative, less than one 
in absolute value and it must be statistically significant. In all model the coefficient of ECM has 
 
Table 13;  Short run relationship between “gfdddi12” and other regresses 
 
Model  Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  Sample  Adj. R-square  
Model Six  
(1, 0, 0, 0) 
C 0.175064 0.277600 31 0.58 
D(GFDDDI12(-1)) 0.487857*** 0.132752 
D(FINREFORM1) 0.442009 0.379294 
D(GDPG) -0.131376*** 0.041407 
D(INF) 0.001826 0.026777 
ECMFIN(-1) -0.403194*** 0.109203 
Model  Variables  Coefficient  Std. Error  Sample  Adj. R-square  
Model Seven  
(1, 0, 0 0) 
C 0.175064 0.277600 31 0.52 
D(GFDDDI12(-1)) 0.487857*** 0.132752 
D(FINREFORM1) 0.442009 0.379294 
D(GDPG) -0.131376*** 0.041407 
D(INF) 0.001826 0.026777 
ECMFIN(-1) -0.403194*** 0.109203 
- ***, ** and * indicates one, five and ten percent level of significances level   
- The dependent variable is Deposit money bank assets to the GDP (%) 
- Source authors Estimation  
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the required value in the short run which implies all model converge to the long run equilibrium. 
This study shows that financial liberalization didn’t have any statistically significant impacts on 
the development of the financial sectors in the short run except interest rate controls and banking 
supervision on table 9, liberalization on security markets and financial reform on table 11 and 
interest rate controls on table 13. Generally this study shows that in the short run, financial 
liberalization didn’t have any significant impacts on the development of the financial sectors. 
This indicates the dynamism of the financial development in the short run.  
The entire model passes the diagnostic tests for serial correlation, functional form 
misspecification and autoregressive conditional hetroscedasticity (ARCH) test. The study also 
tests for all models the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares 
(CUSUMSQ) of recursive residual test, to check the structural stability. All models are stable 
and correctly specified as both CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test statistics are within the bounds of 
+5 or -5% level of significance.   
Fig. The cumulative Sum of Recursive 
Residual (Finance reform) with gfdddi01 
 
Cumulative Sum of square of the Recursive 
Residual (finance reform) with gfdddi01   
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Fig. The cumulative Sum of Recursive 
Residual (finance reform) with gfdddi12 
 
 
Fig. Cumulative Sum of square of the 
Recursive Residual (finance reform) with 
gfdddi12 
 
 
 
 
Fig. The cumulative Sum of Recursive 
Residual (finance reform) with gfdddi02 
 
 
Fig. Cumulative Sum of square of the 
Recursive Residual (finance reform) with 
gfdddi02 
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5. Conclusion and policy Recommendation 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of the financial liberalization policy on 
financial sector development in Ethiopia as well as identify the most promising sectors in the 
financial liberalization policy. To that end the study used the Autoregressive Distributive lag 
(ARDL) approaches to analyze the data. The finding of the study supported the theory mentioned 
by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), which decreasing the interferences of the states in the 
financial sectors will deepen the development of the financial sectors. It proves financial 
liberalizations policy has positive and statistically significant impact on the development of the 
financial sectors in the long run. Liberalization in the Banking supervision is the most effective 
and efficient financial liberalization policy in Ethiopia. On the other hand, in the short run 
financial liberalization didn’t have any significant impacts on the development of the financial 
sectors. According to the ECM test all model in this study have negative, less than one in 
absolute value and statistically significant value of ECM which implies that all model in study 
converge to the equilibrium in the long run. 
 
This positive impact of the financial liberalization policy on the development of the Ethiopia’s 
financial sectors implies the better implementation status of the Ethiopia governments. So, by 
strengthening and expanding the full implementation status of the financial liberalization policy, 
the Ethiopia government should have to maximize the advantage of the financial liberalization. 
Specifically, the Ethiopia governments should have to focus in the area of liberalization in the 
banking supervision which is the most effective financial liberalization policy. Second according 
to the data set financial privatization is nearly a singular matrix. This is caused by large share of 
financial assets owned by the government financial institution. To increase the share of 
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privatization in the financial assets the government of Ethiopia should have to decrease the 
government owned bank’s financial assets and give attention for the private banks. In Ethiopia’s 
financial sectors the entry of the foreign bank is highly recommendable. Especially for 
developing country like Ethiopia, entry of foreign banks through strategy called as the “Joint 
Venture or Mergers” strategy is highly recommendable. This strategy is important for both 
Ethiopia banking sectors as well as external financial institution because external bank can 
access the domestic information through its merger and the domestic banks also get the risk 
management skill as well as knowhow from the foreign banks. 
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7. APPEND CODING RULES 
CODING RULES FOR THE FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION INDEX 
To construct an index of financial liberalization, codes were assigned along the eight dimensions 
below. Each dimension has various sub dimensions. Based on the score for each sub dimension, 
each dimension receives a ‘raw score.’ The explanations for each sub-dimension below indicate 
how to assign the raw score.  
After a ‘raw score’ is assigned, it is normalized to a 0-3 scale. The normalization is done on the 
basis of the classifications listed below for each dimension. That is, fully liberalized = 3; 
partially liberalized = 2; partially repressed = 1; fully repressed = 0.  
The final scores are used to compute an aggregate index for each year by assigning equal weight 
to each dimension.  
For example, if the ‘raw score’ on credit controls and reserve requirements totals 4 (by assigning 
a code of 2 for liberal reserve requirements, 1 for lack of directed credit and 1 for lack of 
subsidized directed credit), this is equivalent to the definition of Fully Liberalized. So, the 
normalization would assign a score of 3 on the 0-3 scale.  
I. Credit Controls and Reserve Requirements:  
1) Are reserve requirements restrictive? 
 Coded as 0 if reserve requirement is more than 20 percent.  
 Coded as 1 if reserve requirements are reduced to 10–20 percent or complicated 
regulations to set reserve requirements are simplified as a step toward reducing reserve 
requirements  
 Coded as 2 if reserve requirements are less than 10 percent.  
2) Are there minimum amounts of credit that must be channeled to certain sectors? 
 Coded as 0 if credit allocations are determined by the central bank or mandatory credit 
allocations to certain sectors exist.  
 Coded as 1 if mandatory credit allocations to certain sectors are eliminated or do not exist.  
3) Are there any credits supplied to certain sectors at subsidized rates? 
 Coded as 0 when banks have to supply credits at subsidized rates to certain sectors.  
 Coded as 1 when the mandatory requirement of credit allocation at subsidized rates is 
eliminated or banks do not have to supply credits at subsidized rates.  
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These three questions’ scores are summed and coded as follows:  
Fully Liberalized = [4], Largely Liberalized = [3], Partially Repressed = [1,2], Full Repressed= 
[0] 
II. Aggregate Credit Ceilings  
 Coded as 0 if ceilings on expansion of bank credit are in place. This includes bank-
specific credit ceilings imposed by the central bank.  
  Coded as 1 if no restrictions exist on the expansion of bank credit.  
III. Interest Rate Liberalization  
Deposit rates and lending rates are separately considered, in coding this measure, in order to look 
at the type of regulations for each set of rates. They are coded as being government set or subject 
to a binding ceiling (code=0), fluctuating within a band (code=1) or freely floating (code=2). The 
coding is based on the following description:  
FL=4 [2, 2] 
Fully liberalized if both deposit interest rates and lending interest rates are determined at market 
rates. 
LL = 3 [2, 1]  
Largely Liberalized when either deposit rates or lending rates are freed but the other rates are 
subject to band or only a part of interest rates are determined at market rates.  
PR= 2/1 [2, 0] [1, 1][1, 0]  
Partially Repressed when either deposit rates or lending rates are freed but the other interest rates 
are set by government or subject to ceiling/floor; or both deposit rates and lending rates are 
subject to band or partially liberalized; or either deposit rates or lending rates are subject to band 
or partially liberalized.  
FR= 0 [0, 0] fully Repressed when both deposit rates and lending rates are set by the government 
or subject to ceiling/floor.  
IV. Banking Sector Entry  
The following sub-measures were considered:  
1) To what extent does the government allow foreign banks to enter into a domestic market?  
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This question is coded to examine whether a country allows the entry of foreign banks into a 
domestic market; whether branching restrictions of foreign banks are eased; to what degree the 
equity ownership of domestic banks by nonresidents is allowed.  
 Coded as 0 when no entry of foreign banks is allowed; or tight restrictions on the opening 
of new foreign banks are in place.  
 Coded as 1 when foreign bank entry is allowed, but nonresidents must hold less than 50 
percent equity share.  
 Coded as 2 when the majority of share of equity ownership of domestic banks by 
nonresidents is allowed; or equal treatment is ensured for both foreign banks and 
domestic banks; or an unlimited number of branching is allowed for foreign banks. 
Three questions look at policies to enhance the competition in the domestic banking market.  
2) Does the government allow the entry of new domestic banks?  
 Coded as 0 when the entry of new domestic banks is not allowed or strictly regulated. 
 Coded as 1 when the entry of new domestic banks or other financial institutions is 
allowed into the domestic market. 
3) Are there restrictions on branching? (0/1)  
 Coded as 0 when branching restrictions are in place.  
 Coded as 1 when there are no branching restrictions or if restrictions are eased.  
4) Does the government allow banks to engage in a wide range of activities? (0/1)  
 Coded as 0 when the range of activities that banks can take consists of only banking 
activities.  
 Coded as 1 when banks are allowed to become universal banks. 
The dimension of entry barriers is coded by adding the scores of these three questions.  
Fully Liberalized= 4 or 5, Largely Liberalized= 3, Partially Repressed= 1 or 2, Fully 
Repressed = 0  
V. Capital Account Transactions  
1) Is the exchange rate system unified? (0/1)  
 Coded as 0 when a special exchange rate regime for either capital or current account 
transactions exists.  
 Coded as 1 when the exchange rate system is unified.  
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2) Does a country set restrictions on capital inflow? (0/1)  
 Coded as 0 when significant restrictions exist on capital inflows.  
 Coded as 1 when banks are allowed to borrow from abroad freely without restrictions 
and there are no tight restrictions on other capital inflows.  
3) Does a country set restrictions on capital outflow? (0/1)  
 Coded as 0 when restrictions exist on capital outflows.  
 Coded as 1 when capital outflows are allowed to flow freely or with minimal 
approval restrictions.  
By adding these three items,  
Fully Liberalized = [3], Largely Liberalized = [2], Partially Repressed = [1], Fully 
Repressed= [0]  
VI. Privatization 
Privatization of banks is coded as follows:  
FL: Fully Liberalized if no state banks exist or state-owned banks do not consist of any 
significant portion of banks and/or the percentage of public bank assets is less than 10 
percent.  
LL: Largely liberalized if most banks are privately owned and/or the percentage of public 
bank assets is from 10 percent to 25 percent.  
PR: Partially repressed if many banks are privately owned but major banks are still state-
owned and/or the percentage of public bank assets is 25–50 percent.  
FR: Fully repressed if major banks are all-state owned banks and/or the percentage of public 
bank assets is from 50 percent to 100 percent.  
VII. Securities Markets  
1) Has a country taken measures to develop securities markets? 
 Coded as 0 if a securities market does not exist.  
 Coded as 1 when a securities market is starting to form with the introduction of 
auctioning of T-bills or the establishment of a security commission.  
 Coded as 2 when further measures have been taken to develop securities markets (tax 
exemptions, introduction of medium and long-term government bonds in order to 
build the benchmark of a yield curve, policies to develop corporate bond and equity 
51 
 
markets, or the introduction of a primary dealer system to develop government 
security markets).  
 Coded as 3 when further policy measures have been taken to develop derivative 
markets or to broaden the institutional investor base by deregulating portfolio 
investments and pension funds, or completing the full deregulation of stock 
exchanges.  
2) Is a country’s equity market open to foreign investors?  
 Coded as 0 if no foreign equity ownership is allowed.  
 Coded as 1 when foreign equity ownership is allowed but there is less than 50 percent 
foreign ownership.  
 Coded as 2 when a majority equity share of foreign ownership is allowed.  
By adding these two sub-dimensions,  
 Fully Liberalized = [4 or 5], Largely Liberalized = [3], Partially Repressed = [1, 2], and 
Fully Repressed = [0]  
**NOTE**  
If information on the second sub-dimension was not available (as is the case with some low 
income countries), the measure was coded using information on securities market 
development. If information on securities markets only was considered, a 0-3 scale was 
assigned based on the score on securities markets.  
VIII. Banking Sector Supervision 
1) Has a country adopted a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basle standard? (0/1)  
 Coded as 0 if the Basle risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio is not implemented. Date of 
implementation is important, in terms of passing legislation to enforce the Basle 
requirement of 8 percent CAR.  
 Coded as 1 when Basle CAR is in force. (Note: If the large majority of banks meet the 
prudential requirement of an 8 percent risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio, but this is 
not a mandatory ratio as in Basle, the measure is still classified as 1). 
 Prior to 1993, when the Basle regulations were not in place internationally, this measure 
takes the value of 0.  
2) Is the banking supervisory agency independent from executives’ influence? (0/1/2)  
A banking supervisory agency’s independence is ensured when the banking supervisory 
agency can resolve banks’ problems without delays. Delays are often caused by the lack of 
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autonomy of the banking supervisory agency, which is caused by political interference. For 
example, when the banking supervisory agency has to obtain approval from different 
agencies such as the Minister of Finance (MOF) in revoking or suspending licenses of banks 
or liquidating banks’ assets, or when the ultimate jurisdiction of the banking supervisory 
agency is the MOF, it often causes delays in resolving banking problems. In addition to the 
independence from political interference, the banking supervisory agency also has to be 
given enough power to resolve banks’ problems promptly. 
 Coded as 0 when the banking supervisory agency does not have an adequate legal 
framework to promptly intervene in banks’ activities; and/or when there is the lack of 
legal framework for the independence of the supervisory agency such as the 
appointment and removal of the head of the banking supervisory agency; or the 
ultimate jurisdiction of the banking supervision is under the MOF; or when a frequent 
turnover of the head of the supervisory agency is experienced.  
 Coded as 1 when the objective supervisory agency is clearly defined and an adequate 
legal framework to resolve banking problems is provided (the revocation and the 
suspension of authorization of banks, liquidation of banks, and the removal of banks’ 
executives etc.) but potential problems remain concerning the independence of the 
banking supervisory agency (for example, when the MOF may intervene into the 
banking supervision in such as case that the board of the banking supervisory agency 
board is chaired by the MOF, although the fixed term of the board is ensured by law); 
or although clear legal objectives and legal independence are observed, the adequate 
legal framework for resolving problems is not well articulated.  
 Coded as 2 when a legal framework for the objectives and the resolution of troubled 
banks is set up and if the banking supervisory agency is legally independent from the 
executive branch and actually not interfered by the executive branch.  
3) Does a banking supervisory agency conduct effective supervisions through on-site and off-site 
examinations? (0/1/2)  
Conducting on-site and off-site examinations of banks is an important way to monitor banks’ 
balance sheets.  
 Coded as 0 when a country has no legal framework and practices of on-site and off-site 
examinations is not provided or when no on-site and off-site examinations are conducted.  
 Coded as 1 when the legal framework of on-site and off-site examinations is set up and 
the banking supervision agency have conducted examinations but in an ineffective or 
insufficient manner.  
 Coded as 2 when the banking supervisory agency conducts effective and sophisticated 
examinations.  
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4) Does a country’s banking supervisory agency cover all financial institutions without exception? 
(0/1)  
If some kinds of banks are not exclusively supervised by the banking supervisory agency or if 
offshore intermediaries of banks are excluded from the supervision, the effectiveness of the 
banking supervision is seriously undermined.  
 Coded as 1 when all banks are under supervision by supervisory agencies without 
exception.  
 Coded as 0 if some kinds of financial institutions are not exclusively supervised by the 
banking supervisory or are excluded from banking supervisory agency oversights.  
Enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector is coded by summing up these four 
dimensions, which are assigned a degree of reform as follows.  
Highly Regulated = [6], Largely Regulated = [4-5], Less Regulated = [2-3], Not Regulated =  
[0-1] 
 
